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CAsE NoTms

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Search and Seizure-Sufficiency of Complaint to
Support a Search Warrant-Probable Cause. Whitely v. State, 418
P.2d 164 (Wyo. 1966).

On the morning of November 24, 1964, proprietors of a
number of business establishments in the little city of Saratoga, Wyoming, discovered that their stores had been broken
into. The dutiful sheriff of Carbon County took a brief trip
to the scene of the break-ins that same morning to make an
investigation. He turned up no significant clues concerning
the identity of the burglars.1 On his return to Rawlins, he
appeared before a justice of the peace to swear out a complaint from which the following excerpt is taken:
I, C. W. Ogburn, do solemnly swear that on or
about the 23 day of November, A. D. 1964, in the
County of Carbon and State of Wyoming, the said
Harold Whiteley and Jack Daley, defendants did
then and there unlawfully break and enter a locked
and sealed building. . . contrary to the form of the
Statute in such case made and provided and against
the peace and dignity of the State of Wyoming.
It is to be noted that the above is the entire substance of the
affidavit, no other facts or circumstances being given except
for the location of the building. Upon the authority of this
complaint, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Whiteley
and Daley. The sheriff put out a state item through the Casper
patrol office calling for the arrest of the two suspects. Modern communications soon spread the call to Laramie, where
an alert patrolman spotted the wanted men as they were about
to enter the Buckhorn Bar. Proceeding on the authority of
the radio alert, the officer arrested the two men. Then, acting
together with other members of the Laramie police and the
Albany County Sheriff's office, he conducted a search of
the suspects' car, there to descry the booty, consisting of
some old coins which had been collected by one of the victimized businessmen, which it was alleged had been taken from
the establishments in Saratoga. The suspects were taken to
Rawlins, where a new complaint was sworn out (identical to
the first except as to date) and another warrant was issued.
When Whiteley was brought to trial, the goods seized
1. This conclusion is substantiated by testimony given by Sheriff Ogburn at
the trial, shown in the transcript at pp. 86-54.
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together with the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice
were sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. The court-appointed attorney who was defending Whiteley made mild objections to the introduction of the goods into evidence. His
protests were overruled.
Whiteley took an appeal to the Supreme Court of the
State of Wyoming, based upon four grounds, only one of
which is relevant here.' That is, the ground that the trial court
admitted into evidence certain items which were obtained by
the police through an unlawful search of the defendant's
automobile. iHe proceeded upon two alternative theories:
first, that the arresting officer did not have sufficient information to make a lawful arrest; and second, that even if there
was probable cause for arrest, the usual circumstances which
justify an ancillary search were not present.' The court had
no difficulty in disposing of this argument. The major premise is unquestionably sound, being that a peace officer may
make an arrest without a warrant when he has reasonable
or probable grounds to suspect that the person whom he is
about to arrest has counitted a felony. The court's minor premise can be adequately delineated only through a direct quotation.
In this instance, the officer in the regular course
of his employment as a police officer was advised by
the usual dissemination from his superiors, which in
turn came by broadcast radio, based upon the issuance of a warrant, that two burglars were sought.
He knew defendant's companion. He had a description of the vehicle being driven. If he had not proceeded with the arrest he would have been in violation of his duty. It must be held that the arrest was
reasonable and proper.4
Once the decision that the arrest was lawful was pronounced,
there appeared no obstacle to a determination that a search
made incident thereto, and reasonable under the circumstances, was all right; and that the fruits of that search were
properly admitted by the trial court.
2. Whiteley v. State, 418 P.2d 164, 165 (Wyo. 1966).
3. "i.e., (a) the arrested person is armed or might attempt to escape; (b) the
arrested person might destroy evidence which is the fruit or implement of
the crime for which he has been arrested; and (c) the protection of the
arresting officer .
I..." at 167.
Id.
4. Ibid.
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The thesis of this essay is that the decision in Whiteley v.
State was based upon an imprecise, superficial formulation of the sorites. A proper inquiry would have begun with
a major premise stating that the legality of the arrest of
Whiteley (and thus the validity of the search and seizure of
the goods) would depend entirely upon the sufficiency of the
complaint to support the warrant which was issued. The sufficiency of the complaint is in turn predicated upon a finding
of probable cause made not by the police but rather in a neutral and detached manner by a magistrate. A brief excursion
into the relevant portions of the law of arrest will serve to
'demonstrate these propositions.
First, the statute in Wyoming provides that when a written complaint is filed with a justice, then he shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the person accused if there appear to
be reasonable grounds supporting the affiant's contention.'
The annotation in the statute book directs our attention to
C. J. S. for a few paragraphs about probable cause.' The magistrate, it is said, is to look for evidence solid enough to create
a strong indication of guilt. He is not to be swayed by mere
hearsay or suspicion. To quote, "there must be laid before the
magistrate some legal evidence that a crime has been committed, and that the person charged has committed it. "' Here
is the criterion established for use in interpreting the statute
in the State of Wyoming. As we proceed with our inquiry,
we shall see that it is merely a distillation of the essence of
the pronouncements made by numerous courts on this subject. The norm is that the magistrate must know of the reasons for the suspicion and must weight them impartially in
arriving at his determination of probable cause.
From the transcript of the Whiteley trial, we are given
all we know about the facts leading to the suspicion of Whiteley. The following quotation is taken from the direct examination of Sheriff Ogburn by the prosecution. The Sheriff has
5.

WYo. STAT. § 7-160 (1957): "Whenever a complaint in writing and upon
oath, signed by the complainant, shall be filed with the justice, charging
any person with the commission of any offense, it shall be the duty of
such justice to issue a warrant for the arrest of the person accused, if
he shall have reasonable grounds to believe that the offense charged has
been committed." See also WYO. STAT. §§ 7-411 and 7-412 (1957), providing
necessary elements of a complaint together with a suggested form.
6. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 320 (1961).
7. Ibid.
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just told of going to Saratoga to look around at the scene
of the crime.
Q: After you had finished your investigation, what
A:

'did you do ?

After we finished our investigation we come
back to Rawlins, and through a tip, why, we put
out an item, state item on two suspects of the
robbery.
Q: Who were the two suspects ?
A: Jack Daly and Mr. Harold Whiteley.8 (emphasis supplied)
The totality of revealed circumstances indicating probable
cause for the arrest of Whiteley was but a single tip, of unknown origin, of undisclosed nature. No attempt was made
by the defense attorney to elicit more information upon crossexamination. No mention is made of this fact in the opinion of
the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming. We will return to a consideration of the legal significance of tips in a
later paragraph. But the direct examination quoted above
should be kept in mind during the intervening discussion.
Second, we have a great body of common law concerning
the subject of probable cause, from which it will be necessary
to consider but a few of the more important cases. Some of
these cases deal with search warrants, some with warrants
for arrest. In the words of the Supreme Court of the United
States, "The language of the Fourth Amendment, that '...
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . .' of

course applies to arrest as well as search warrants."9 In the
0 the Supreme Court notes that
case of Aguilar v. Tezas,"
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the standards governing probable cause developed under the Fourth Amendment
are made mandatory upon the states.
Giordenello v. United States"1 is directly in point. In that
case, a complaint was sworn out by a narcotics agent, containing allegations that Giordenello was possessed of heroin
in violation of a federal statute." Upon that complaint, a
8. Transcript of the Whiteley trial, p. 40.
9. Giordenello v. United States, 857 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958).
10. 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1963).
11. Giordenello v. United States, supra note 9.
12. The sworn complaint read, in part, "The undersigned complainant being
duly sworn states: That on or about January 26, 1956, at Houston, Texas
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warrant was issued for his arrest. An arrest was made on authority of the warrant. A search incident to the arrest revealed heroin in possession of the defendant. Motions to suppress
the use of the heroin as evidence were denied by the trial
court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, defendant's primary
theory was that the complaint was defective in that it recited
no more than the elements of the crime charged. Upon that
theory, the Court reversed the conviction. The constitutional
protection of the Fourth Amendment, implemented in this
instance by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that a magistrate make a cool and impartial
determination of probable cause before issuing a warrant. Because the complaint showed on its face nothing indicative
of the source of the affiant's belief that the defendant had
violated the law, the complaint was defective. Thus, the warrant issued upon its authority was invalid, which meant that
the evidence seized in a search incident to arrest under the
warrant was illegally obtained and should have been suppressed.
Similar statements were made in United States v. Vent'resca.5 There the Court indicated that probable cause cannot be shown by affidavits which are purely conclusory." ' It
is not sufficient for the affiant to state his belief that probable cause exists without giving details of the underlying
grounds which form the basis for that belief.
The rationale for the position taken by the Court is clear.
Public policy demands that citizens be free from arrest unless
a clear case for their detention can be made. Perhaps the most
• . . Veto Giordenello did receive, conceal, etc., narcotic drugs . . . with
knowledge of unlawful importation; in violation of Section 174, Title 21,
United States Code.
"And the complainant further states that he believes that
are material witnesses in relation to this charge." Id. at 481.
The essential similarity of this complaint to that from the Whiteley case
is obvious.
13. 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965).
14. In Ventresea, the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued stated
specifically the grounds for the belief of the affiant. It was described seven
trips of a vehicle made to defendant's residence, carrying tin cans and
sugar, and bringing away what appeared to be full cans. Investigators
claimed to have smelled the odor of fermenting mash near the house. Sounds
like those made by a pump were overheard. The court chose to sustain the
validity of a search made upon a warrant issued upon this affidavit. But
note the degree of particularity with which the affiant supported his conclusions. The affidavit is set forth in toto Id. at 112. A look at it would be
.
.
. ... " . : .
rewarding in this context.
... .. ..
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quoted statement of the policy of the Court is found in a dictum of Mr. Justice Jackson in Johnson v. United States:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprises of ferreting out
crime."8
Commenting upon that dictum in the Aguilar case, Mr. Justice Goldberg said, "Although the reviewing court will pay
substantial deference to judicial determinations of probable
cause, the court must still insist that the magistrate perform
his 'neutral and detached' function and not serve merely as
a rubber stamp for the police."'" It is entirely the business of
an appellate court to inquire first into the basis of the magistrate's decision to allow a warrant to issue. This is properly
where the Wyoming Supreme Court should have started its
reasoning. The belief of the arresting officer is irrelevant
to the real issue, which is, was the complaint sufficient to
support a warrant for Whiteley's arrest. The law 'discussed
in the paragraphs above indicates that it probably was not.
The least that it indicates is that the sufficiency should have
been considered by the court in its opinion.
The direct examination of Sheriff Ogburn showed that
he had acted upon a tip. As we shall see below, a tip may be
sufficient to show probable cause. But we must first consider
the cautionary words of the Supreme Court in Aguilar v.
Texas. The Court expresses a feeling that the conclusions of
an informer are even more suspect than those of an offi.cer.
Whether such a statement can have much meaning is academic. Its thrust is sufficiently clear: mere conclusions,
with no supporting facts, whether they be the decisions of an
officer of the law or of an informant, with no statement implying personal knowledge and the source therefor, are totally
insufficient to support a valid warrant. To quote from the
Court's opinion, "The magistrate must be informed of some
15. 388 U.S. 10 (1948).
16. Id. at 13-14.
17. Aguilar v. Texas, supra note 10, at 111.
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of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
concluded that the norcotics were where he claimed they were,
and some of the underlying circumstances from which the
officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not
be disclosed [citing case] was 'credible' or his information 're-

liable.' '18
The leading case on tips is Draper v. United States.1 9 A
hired informant, whose information had in the past experience of the narcotics agents been highly reliable, told an
agent that Draper would be returning to Denver on a train
on a certain day, dressed in a certain manner, carrying heroin.
On this information, the agent awaited the train. When it arrived, the information in the description proved accurate. He
therefore arrested Draper without a warrant, making a search
which uncovered a supply of heroin in his pocket. Motions
to suppress the evidence were denied by the trial court. Over
the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas, the Supreme
Court sustained Draper's conviction on the theory that the
narcotics agent had had probable cause to make the arrest.
But notice that even here, the circumstances surrounding
the tip were carefully scrutinized. The informant's accuracy
in describing dress and mannerism were considered to indicate that the agent could rely upon his accuracy in the one
further particular: possession of narcotics. But because
there is no mention made of the nature of Sheriff Ogburn's
tip in the Whiteley case, either on trial or in the Wyoming
Supreme Court's opinion, we can assume only that it has not
been considered.
From the above discussion of the law of probable cause
and arrest, it is plain that the first question which should have
been undertaken by the Wyoming Supreme Court was that
of the sufficiency of the complaint. It seems clear from the
record that the complaint was not sufficient in that it did
not reveal the sources of the affiant's belief. The safeguard
supposed to be present in the person of the neutral and
detached magistrate was absent. All that was present was a
bare skeleton of a conclusion, the body for which was predicated in a shroud of secrecy. Because the complaint was insufficient, the warrant was not valid; thus, the ensuing ar18. Id. at 114.
19. 358 U.S. 807 (1959).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1967

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 2 [1967], Iss. 2, Art. 12

484

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. II

rest under that warrant was unlawful; and therefore, finally
the evidence seized in the search conducted at the time of that
arrest should properly have been suppressed.
The implications following logically from this opinion
are serious. It now appears that a Chief of Police can avoid
the prescriptions of the Fourth Amendment by the simple
expedient of ordering one of his officers to make an arrest.
If the end of the proper inquiry is to discover whether or not
the officer obeyed his orders, then the Fourth Amendment
is effectively isolated from participation in Wyoming arrests.
But this is not to suggest that the Supreme Court of the State
of Wyoming had this in mind while it was considering its
opinion in the Whiteley case. What appears is that the court
had nothing in mind at the time except insuring the continued incarceration of an obviously guilty man. The lesson
0
repeated by Mr. Justice Douglas in Henry v. United States"
was perhaps forgotten. He said, "an arrest is not justified
by what the subsequent search discloses. Under our system
suspicion is not enough for an officer to lay hands on a citizen. It is better, so the Fourth Amendment teaches, that the
guilty sometimes go free than that citizens be subjected to
easy arrest.""'
Perhaps on a proper brief submitted to show the state
of the law as outlined above, the Wyoming Court will in some
future hearing further enlighten us as to what it means to do
about the Fourth Amendment.
HUGH B. McFADDEN, JR.

20. 861 U.S. 98 (1959).
21. Id. at 104.
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